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Kwall: Hoisting Originality: A Response

HOISTING ORIGINALITY: A RESPONSE
By Roberta Rosenthal Kwall*
This commentary originally appeared as part of the inaugural
Virtual Workshop sponsored by the Intellectual Property Institute
at the University of Richmond School of Law. The workshop
featured a paper entitled Hoisting Originality by Professor Joseph
Miller, along with two commentaries on the paper.'
When
Professor James Gibson of University of Richmond Law School
invited me to comment on Miller's work, he mentioned that this
was a paper about which I would want to think deeply, and
Professor Miller's paper certainly lives up to this representation.
In Hoisting Originality, Miller argues that the current statutory
copyright standard for originality does not do the job, and proposes
instead that copyright "draw on patent law's nonobviousness
requirement-with its focus on departure from conventional
wisdom as the mark of a protectable invention .
*."..2
Thus,
Miller's recommendation would call for an assessment of whether
a given work embodies a unique authorial voice that "stands apart
from conventional expression." 3
The "creative" aspect of
originality, according to Miller, should be judged by whether it
reflects "the unconventional, the unpredicted, the unorthodox." 4
The problem, as we all know, is that copyright has developed in
ways that were not imaginable during the last go-round of reform
discussions in the middle of the twentieth century. For years now,
intellectual property scholars have proposed a multitude of cures
for a system that is generally perceived as increasingly ailing and
ineffective. It makes sense that originality should be part of this
discussion. Miller reads my own work on originality and moral
* © 2010 by Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Raymond P. Niro Professor of
Intellectual Property Law, Founding Director, DePaul College of Law Center
for Intellectual Property Law and Information Technology.
1. The idea of a virtual workshop, complete with widespread virtual
participation beyond that of the initial contributors, is a wonderfully different
idea and I thank Professor James Gibson of Richmond for inviting (and
encouraging) me to participate and for pairing me with Professor Justin Hughes,
a scholar for whom my personal respect is evident in so many of my own works.
2. Joseph Scott Miller, Hoisting Originality,31 CARDOZO L. REV. 451, 463
(2009).
3. Id. at 477.
4. Id. at 484-85.
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rights, Originality in Context,5 as an endorsement for keeping the
current low standard of originality for copyright law but invoking
a heightened standard of originality for purposes of our currently
non-existent moral rights laws. In reality, however, my purpose in
writing this article, as well as my forthcoming larger work on
moral rights,6 was not to challenge the current standard of
copyright originality but rather to devise an appropriate and viable
standard for moral rights in the context of the current copyright
law. In terms of Miller's suggestion that moral rights should be
applied to works with lower originality than copyright law, 7 this
position would be inconsistent not only with the Berne Convention
but also with virtually every other country with moral rights
protections. Notable exceptions are two of the instruments
composing the International Bill of Human Rights, which
contemplate the extension of moral rights to non-copyrightable
works. Nonetheless, for reasons I have explored in my other
works, to the extent the United States contemplates the enactment
of a more comprehensive form of moral rights protections than
currently exists under VARA, I do not believe the best approach is
to apply moral rights to a wider array of works than are currently
covered under copyright law. 9
My approach to moral rights does not, however, foreclose the
question of whether copyright itself ought to be refashioned with a
heightened standard of originality. In this respect, if given the
opportunity to re-evaluate copyright's originality requirement, I
would certainly be open to elevating the standard for copyright
protection, especially if this were done as part of a larger effort of
copyright reform on a more general basis. The need for increased
attention to originality was, somewhat ironically, evidenced even
during the relatively brief period we had to write our responses to
Miller's article by the decision in Situation Management Systems,

5. Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Originality in Context, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 871
(2007).
6. See ROBERTA ROSENTHAL KWALL, THE SOUL OF CREATIVITY: FORGING A
MORAL RIGHTS LAW FOR THE UNITED STATES (forthcoming 2010).
7. Miller, supra note 2, at 494.
8. These instruments are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966.
9. See generally KWALL, supra note 6.
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Inc. v. ASP Consulting, LLC, a copyright infringement suit in
which the First Circuit vacated the district court's finding of
noninfringement on the ground that the training manuals at issue
met the minimal originality standard.°
As Diane Zimmerman has reminded us, it makes sense to frame
the issue of originality by addressing the values that copyright law
protects; unfortunately, however, there is no one clear answer to
this question." We do know that the Framers were motivated by
concerns regarding dissemination of knowledge and preservation
of a public domain necessary to insure access to necessary
information. Relevant to these concerns was the Framers' desire
for the United States to be "culturally competitive" with other
nations, a goal that could only be achieved through the enactment
of copyright laws that would encourage authorship activity. 2
As Miller notes, the concept of originality has captured
significant scholarly attention. 3 Most recently, copyright scholars
have pondered whether a graduated system of originality is the
best way to promote copyright's objectives. 4 This view, if ever
formally enacted, might result in a system of protection based on
multiple levels of originality. Although such a content-specific
system of protection may seem very remote, hints of this idea exist
in proposed federal legislation that would afford a form of sui
generis, or copyright-like, protection for the overall appearance of
new and original fashion designs for a three-year period. 5
10. Situation Mgmt. Sys., Inc. v. ASP Consulting LLC, 560 F.3d 53, 62 (1st
Cir. 2009).
11. Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, It's an Original! (?): In Pursuit of
Copyright's Elusive Essence, 28 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 187, 189 (2005). See also
Pamela Samuelson, Enriching Discourse on Public Domains, 55 DuKE L.J. 783
(2006)(identifying thirteen conceptions of the public domain).
12. Irah Donner, The Copyright Clause of the US. Constitution: Why Did the
FramersInclude It with UnanimousApproval?, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 361, 362
(1992).
13. Miller, supra note 2, at 462-463
14. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Originality, 95 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2009) available at http://ssm.com/abstract-1361911. The idea of a
graduated system of originality also was a major theme in the informal
discussion at the Interdisciplinary Intellectual Property & Technology
Immersion Conference, in New York City (2006) (sponsored by Albany Law
School).
15. Design Piracy Prohibition Act, H.R. 2033, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007); S.
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I have written elsewhere that copyright ownership ought to be
understood as involving "duties to the public as well as rights in
the work,"' 6 and refining the originality requirement, either
through a graduated system or a more unified "hoisted" framework
as Miller proposes, fosters the idea that one's rights should
correspond to the level of one's contribution. Moreover, I believe
that "hoisting" the statutory originality requirement is a completely
"kosher" approach from the standpoint of the history of
copyright's development. As William Patry has observed: "The
Feist Court did not strip Congress of its voice on all originality
issues; instead, the Court only set a threshold standard. Congress
is free to set a higher standard, or, in protecting particular types of
works, to declare how the originality requirement must be
satisfied."'7

Additionally, Miller's call for reforming copyright originality by
invoking patent law's standard is intriguing, at least on a
superficial level. The Supreme Court has invoked patent law
analogies in applying copyright law on at least two occasionsSony's "substantial non-infringing uses""8 and Grokster's
"inducement" 9 applications. Nonetheless, the use of a patent law
analogy in assessing the issue of contributory infringement does, at
least in my mind, have a completely different feel from the
invocation of a patent law analogy in the context of the
fundamental issue of what type of subject matter ought to qualify
for protection in the first place. As David Lange and Jeff Powell
write, "the nature of the property interest at stake in copyright is
substantially different from the more exclusive interest . . . in a

patent."2
Miller recognizes this distinction, however, and
qualifies his proposal by explaining that he does not recommend
1957, 110th Cong. § 2 (2007).
16. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The Author as Steward "For Limited
Times, "88 B.U. L. REV. 685, 704 (2008).
17. See Willliam Patry, The Enumerated Powers Doctrine and Intellectual
Property: An Imminent Constitutional Collision, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359,
377 n.104 (1999).
18. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439-40 (1984).
See also DAVID L. LANGE & H. JEFFERSON POWELL, No LAW: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY IN THE IMAGE OF AN ABSOLUTE FIRST AMENDMENT 53 (2009).

19. MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935-36 (2005).
at 55.

20. LANGE & POWELL, supra note 18,
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that copyright adopt the same standard as patent law, 2' but rather a
"patent-inspired" one.22 He urges a standard that seems to be
informed by patent law's nonobviousness standard. As noted
above, the essence of his position appears to be that
unconventionality should be the new sine qua non of originality.
On a practical level, any reform of the originality requirement
will necessitate a corresponding reform of the copyright
registration system, an area Miller does not address in detail. The
Copyright Office does not probe deeply into the status of a work's
originality: "The application form obliges the applicant to assure
the Register under oath that the work is original, but as a rule no
attempt is made to search probingly for evidence of prior works
that might throw suspicion or doubt upon that assurance."23 Most
copyright applications are approved.24 This situation stands in
stark contrast to that of patent registration procedure.
Another difficulty with Miller's approach lurks on the cusp
between its practical implementation and conceptual grounding.
With respect to issues of proof, Miller seems to contemplate that
originality can be proved both by prospective copyright owners in
applying for a copyright 25 (thus raising the above issue regarding
the examination procedure), as well as by accused infringers who
must assemble a "rich factual record" showing conventionality in
order to defend against an infringement claim. 6 At the trial level,

it seems as though such a standard will inevitably foster expert
witness battles regarding a work's conventional nature within the
genre at issue.
Moreover, it is not entirely clear to me whose narrative would
govern whether a given work would meet this proposed originality
standard. Miller appears to endorse a "work-centered" creativity
assessment, based in part on the standard in Burrow-Giles rather
than an "author-centeredeffort assessment."27 I wonder, however,
whether these criteria are independent. For example, my read of
21. Miller, supra note 2, at 468
22. Id. at 464.
23. LANGE & POWELL, supra note

18, at 39.

24. Id.
25. Miller, supra note 2, at 486.

26. Id. at 487.
27. Id. at 475-76.
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Burrow-Giles is that the Court was not impervious to "authoreffort." Burrow-Giles focused on the photographer's pre-shutter
staging of the process as the justification for originality, which
made sense in terms of both the artistic view of photography
prevalent at that time and the need for preserving the notion that
post-shutter activities are free of artistic choice, and thus remain
author-free and objective.28 Christine Farley has observed that at
the time of this decision, the prevailing view was that the image
produced by photography was free of human intervention and,
therefore, well-suited as objective evidence in legal disputes.29 A
focus on the photographer's input as consisting of pre-shutter
activity facilitated this conception.
More fundamentally, however, it is not clear to me why "the
degree to which [a] work moves away from conventional
expression for [a given] genre at the time the author authors it"3
should be the key to originality. In fact, a recent paper by Amy
Adler suggests the very problems inherent in this approach. Adler
laments how moral rights regimes fail to recognize "the defining
role that destruction has come to play in contemporary artistic
practice."'"
Her work provides numerous examples of this
"destruction art" which, in effect, challenge the application of the
standard proposed by Miller. For example, in 1953 Robert
Rauschenberg created "Erased de Kooning Drawing," which
consisted of nothing more than a month's long effort by
Rauschenberg erasing a drawing by Willem de Kooning, resulting
in a "sheet of paper bearing the faint, ghostly shadow of its former
markings."32 Admittedly, this was an unorthodox and radical
approach, given that de Kooning was regarded as an icon at the
time of Rauschenberg's endeavor. Adler notes that in this milieu,
"erasing a drawing by de Kooning was a shocking, sacrilegious
act" which "captured, perhaps better than anything else
Rauschenberg did, his scandalous assault on a particular

28. See Christine Haight Farley, The Lingering Effects of Copyright's
Response to the Invention of Photography,65 U. PiTr. L. REV. 385, 437 (2004).
29. Id.
30. Miller, supra note 2, at 462.
31. Amy Adler, Against Moral Rights, 97 CAL. L. REV. 263, 265 (2009).
32. Id. at 283 (quoting CALVIN TOMKINS, OFF THE WALL 97 (1980)).
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conception of 'art."' 33

Clearly Rauschenberg's erasure would

meet Miller's proposed standard for originality. But the operative
question is whether Rauschenberg's "creation" ought to be
regarded as more "original" for purposes of applying copyright's
protections than Miller's own law review article, which he
suggests (although perhaps with "tongue in cheek") might not
meet his proposed standard.
There are other complications inherent in the "unorthodox"
standard that are also illustrated by the modem art genre.
Returning to Adler's discussion of Rauschenberg, Adler makes it
clear that his erasure work was unorthodox in its time. Now,
however, the concept of "destruction art" is ubiquitous in the
world of contemporary art. Under Miller's proposal, it is at least
questionable whether the many such works that pervade the
Chelsea galleries today would qualify as copyrightable subject
matter because they are no longer seemingly "unorthodox." A
further problem, at least in the context of this particular genre, is
whether even modem contemporary art visionaries would fail to
meet Miller's proposed originality standard because their
unorthodox works consist almost entirely of labor and sweat,
which Feist ruled out as a basis for satisfying the "modicum" of
creativity necessary for originality.34 Adler also writes about
Damien Hirst, "the best-selling living artist," who sought to
produce the most expensive work of contemporary art by
encrusting a skull with diamonds. This work was sold to an
investor for a hundred million dollars.35 Unorthodox? Of course!
Would Miller say this satisfies his proposed standard for
originality? If so, one has to wonder exactly what is being
protected here-an original work of expression, a work of labor, or
just an unorthodox idea? And how would appropriation art fare
under Miller's proposed standards? These questions illustrate that
the lines of application and theory are easily blurred.
Notwithstanding these reactions to Miller's articulated standard,
it seems to me that an elevated standard for copyright originality
has promise, and I have already laid the groundwork for how I
could see this working in connection with my recommendations
33. Id. at 283.
34. See Feist Publ'n Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991).
35. Adler, supra note 31, at 298.
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regarding enhanced moral rights protections.36 Drawing on some
of these prior observations, I recommend that we consider a
statutory standard for originality that depends upon "substantial
creativity." I would also propose for consideration an amendment
to the copyright statute that eliminates from coverage particular
types of subject matter characterized by low levels of creativity,
thus raising the bar in a transparent manner. Such statutory
exclusions will not, however, address all of the originality issues,
because cases will arise in which a work is otherwise covered from
a categorical standpoint but lacks substantial creativity in its
particular execution.
In these situations, courts (and perhaps copyright examiners in
the first instance) will simply have to decide what constitutes
"substantial creativity." This should not be especially problematic
in my view. In Burrows-Giles, the Supreme Court recognized that
because copyright law lacks the patent system's safeguard of a
prior examination by an authoritative tribunal, it is more important
in a copyright case for the author to prove originality.37 So from
an early point in time, courts were sensitive to the importance of
how to prove originality in copyright law. I also want to
emphasize that I agree with Miller's point that the originality
determination should not be made to depend entirely on the
judge's subjective perception. Moreover, his proposed
"unconventionality" standard potentially has relevance to a
determination of the requisite originality, although I see it as
furnishing an incomplete basis for the standard's articulation and
application. I would prefer to see an approach that is more nuanced
and capable of greater creativity in application. The beauty of
copyright law, however, is that it already contains the seeds for
how a substantial creativity standard of originality can be applied.
Thus, I would augment evidence of unconventionality with
additional evidence focusing on the author's narrative and the
perceptions of reasonableordinary observers. Burrow-Giles is an
important precedent in this regard, because it focused on the
narrative supplied by the photographer with respect to his actions
in furtherance of pre-shutter, "composition-making" activity.3"
36. See KWALL, supra note 6, chapter 6.
37. Burrows-Giles Lithogroaphic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1884).
38. Id.at 60.
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The importance of the claimant's narrative also is underscored by
the line of decisions addressing the issue of conceptual
separability, which, in assessing whether the design process
reflects the creator's artistic judgment independent of functional
considerations, requires the claimant to furnish "evidence relating
to the design process and the nature of the work .

.

.""

Such a

test relies upon the sequences of the author's actions and decisions
in the design process, but also leaves room to consider the nature
of the work itself. In fact, I believe this type of evidence
underscores Miller's inclination to equate creativity "with an
author's thoughtful, considered engagement with the stuff of
expression .
*."..""4
Unlike Miller, however, I do not understand
this type of evidence to be limited to the objective character of the
work.4
Moreover, in applying the above test for conceptual separability,
some courts also have incorporated a focus on whether reasonable
beholders of the work are able to conceptualize its artistic aspects
as existing independently of function. The "ordinary reasonable
observer" traditionally has been invoked to decide other
conceptual issues in copyright law such as substantial similarity.
Thus, there is no reason to preclude such evidence in
determinations of originality, and the introduction of such
evidence would serve as a useful counterpart to evidence based on
the author's narrative and the work itself.
The beauty of our profession is that we continually have the
opportunity to engage in the "circle" of creativity. The original
Virtual Workshop in which both Professor Miller and I
participated demonstrated the operation of this circle in a most
compelling way. I would like to conclude by "hoisting" the level
of originality of this commentary by doing something rather
unorthodox insofar as the "reply/commentary" genre is concerned.
Therefore, I dedicate this commentary to my dear friend and now
former colleague, Kathy Strandburg, whom all of us at DePaul
very much miss.

39. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d
Cir. 1987).

40. Miller, supra note 2, at 479.
41. Id.

Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016

9

DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 2

https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss1/2

10

